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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:
t

Case No. 920234-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 2

ARTHUR RIBE,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Leslie A. Lewis, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issue is presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a standard "knockand-announce" search warrant even though the officers executing
the warrant did not "knock-and-wait" for a response before
entering defendant's residence, thereby violating Utah Code Ann.
S 77-23-10 (1990)?
"Because of the trial court's advantageous position in
determining the factual basis for a motion to suppress, that
determination should not be reversed unless it is clearly
erroneous."

State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255, 256 (Utah App. 1992)

(citations omitted).

Also, under the circumstances of this case,

the trial court's ultimate decision not to exclude the seized
evidence despite the officers' violation of § 77-23-10 is a legal
conclusion, which this Court reviews de novo.

££.. State v. Rowe,

806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991) (The question of an officer's
good faith reliance on an improper nighttime search authorization
is subject to de novo

review.), rev'd on other grounds, 196 Utah

Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah September 28, 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, house, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-10 (1990). Force used in
executing warrant — Notice of authority prerequisite, when.
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building, room,
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure,
the officer executing the warrant may use
such force as is reasonably necessary to
enter:
(1) If, after notice of his authority
and purpose, there is no response or he is
not admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the
officer need not give notice. The magistrate
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath,
that the object of the search may be quickly
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that
physical harm may result to any person if
notice were given.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with possession of
a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp.
1991) (R. 6). Pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah
1988), defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty, thereby
reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress (R. 72-8).

The trial court sentenced

defendant to a term of zero to five years in the Utah State
Prison.

The court stayed execution of that sentence and placed

defendant on probation (R. 92-3).

Defendant is not presently

incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On March 19, 1991, detectives Kevin Judd and Craig
Watson, along with other officers from the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office and the Metro Narcotics Strike Force, went to
defendant's residence to execute a standard "knock-and-announce"
search warrant.

As the officers approached the residence,

defendant was exiting the front door of the house.

Upon seeing

the officers, defendant began running from the scene (R. 179,
207-08).
Some of the officers pursued defendant while others
went to the front door of the house.

Throughout the encounter,

the officers repeatedly yelled such phrases as "[p]olice,"
1

The State recites the facts in the light most favorable to
the court's ruling. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah
1989).
3

" [s]earch warrant; police,"

,f

[s]top running.

Police," and

"[s]top Ringo2; police" before entering defendant's residence
(R. 173, 174, 181, 183, 202, 208, 209).
As Judd approached the residence, he saw some of his
fellow officers run past his left shoulder in pursuit of
defendant.

Judd then knew that his assignment was to go to the

front door (R. 207-08).

The interior front door was open, and

the exterior storm door was closed but not locked (R. 175-76,
208-09).

As Judd explained, "[t]he interior door was wide open.

I could see right into the living room" (R. 208). Defendant's
wife and daughter were sitting in the living room, and the
marijuana that was the subject of the search warrant was
approximately five feet from defendant's wife (R. 150-51).
Judd testified that he never knocked on the storm door
(R. 210). Rather, "[he] ran to the front door[,] grabbed the
door and called, 'Police,' and ran in.

Directly off to [his]

left was [defendant's] wife sitting on a couch" (R. 209).
Because the interior door was already open, Judd only opened the
unlocked storm door3, stepped through the open doorway and
yelled, "[p]olice. Don't move" (R. 209). According to Judd, he
did not use any devices, such as a crowbar or battering ram, to

2

"Ringo" is defendant's nickname.

3

Even defendant's wife admitted that "[t]he outer [storm]
door has no latch or nothing [sic] on it. So it is just open
right now" (R. 196).

4

gain entry/
The other officers secured defendant approximately ten
feet away from the residence (R. 168, 200). The officers then
realized that the search warrant had been inadvertently left on a
desk at the police station.

Detective Rick Lewis was sent to

retrieve the warrant, and he returned approximately 25 minutes
later.

The officers then showed the search warrant to both

defendant and his wife, and seized the marijuana (R. 169, 184-85,
211-12).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State concedes that the officers in this case
violated Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990) when they entered
defendant's residence without first knocking and waiting for a
response because the search warrant did not contain a no-knock
authorization and there were no exigent circumstances to justify
entry on a no-knock basis.

Nevertheless, under the criteria

articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Buck, 756 P.2d
700 (Utah 1988), the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion to suppress.
Suppression is not an appropriate remedy in this case
because the police conduct did not constitute an egregious
violation of § 77-23-10, and none of the basic interests that
4

Defendant's wife testified that the interior door was
closed, but not locked, and that the officers pounded on the door
several times and eventually pried it open (R. 188-90). The
trial court expressly rejected that testimony and found that
defendant's wife "was not a credible witness in any respect" and
that her testimony "was contradicted by the testimony of everyone
else" (R. 237).
5

support the "knock-and-wait" requirement were appreciably
compromised by the violation.

Moreover, there is nothing in the

record that indicates defendant was substantially prejudiced by
the violation or that the police officers executed the search in
bad-faith, which according to State v. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep.
14 (September 28, 1992), are the touchstones for determining that
suppression is an appropriate remedy for a statutory violation.
This Court should therefore uphold the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress and affirm defendant's conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALTHOUGH THE OFFICERS DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-10
(1990), THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE
VIOLATION WAS NOT EGREGIOUS AND THE BASIC
INTERESTS THAT SUPPORT THE KNOCK-AND-WAIT
REQUIREMENT WERE SATISFIED.
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress based on its assessment of the police conduct as it
related to the requirements and purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 7723-10 (1990).

In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the

trial court made the following findings from the bench:
Based upon [the testimony in this case],
I'm going to deny the motion to suppress for
the following reasons. We had here a
standard search warrant that was executed.
That search warrant did not have a no-knock
exception. In other words, it required that
the police announce their presence.
My finding is that the police did
announce their presence. That was the
testimony of the witness Watson and the
witness Judd.
Further, its my finding that the

6

circumstances were such that, and all of the
witnesses attested to this, the defendant was
exiting the home as the police arrived, heard
the police identify themselves as police, saw
them in uniform, saw them in the vicinity of
police vehicles, and that, according to the
testimony of at least some of the police
officers, he fled from police.
It's my finding that actual notice is
the legal requirement, and that occurred in
this instance.
Further, it's my finding that based upon
the testimony of Officers Watson and Judd,
the door in question was open, not closed,
obviating in part the knock requirement,
especially in view of the fact that the
testimony was clear that the defendant had
already seen these individuals as he was
exiting, or as he had already exited the
[house].
It's further my finding that Mrs. Ribe,
who testified on behalf of the defendant, to
the fact that there was considerable damage
done to the door frame and pounding against
the door frame, was not a credible witness in
any respect. Her testimony was not supported
by anyone else, and in fact was contradicted
by the testimony of everyone else. No one
heard these sounds or saw the damage that she
described.
And based upon the foregoing, as I
indicated, I am denying the motion to
suppress.
(R. 236-38).

(These pages of the record are attached hereto as

Addendum A.)
The trial court also entered a brief, written order
denying defendant's motion (R. 59-60).

The court's order, in its

entirety, reads as follows:
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on
for decision on September 6, at 8:15 A.M.
before the Honorable Leslie Lewis.
After having reviewed the transcripts
and having heard argument from the parties
the Court ruled that the police did in fact
announce their presence, that the testimony
of the Defendant's wife was lacking in

7

credibility in view of the totality of facts
and circumstances and that the police
announced their presence and the defendant
saw them and that the police had a search
warrant, and that [although] the storm door
was closed[,J the wooden door was open.
Therefore, the Motion to Suppress was denied.
(R. 59-60)

(A copy of the trial court's order is attached hereto

as Addendum B.)
Stated more precisely, the trial court ruled that § 7723-10 requires that notice of the police authority and purpose be
given, and it found that that requirement was satisfied.

There

is ample evidence to support the trial court's factual finding.
The record makes clear that the officers repeatedly identified
themselves as police officers, and Watson testified that the
officers yelled, "Search warrant; police" prior to their entry
into defendant's residence (R. 173, 174, 181, 183, 202, 208,
209).
However, absent a specific "no-knock" authorization in
the warrant or exigent circumstances, the statute also requires
that officers "knock-and-wait" for a response before entering.
Buck, 756 P.2d at 702. The trial court found not only that the
warrant did not authorize service on a "no-knock" basis, but also
that the officers did not knock-and-wait as required by the
statute (R. 238).5

However, suppression was not an appropriate

5

The State has conceded that there were no exigent
circumstances to justify a no-knock entry (R. 222). As the
record demonstrates, the officers did not have reason to believe
that the ten pounds of marijuana could be quickly disposed of or
that defendant would have weapons or would pose a threat to the
officers (R. 203-205).
8

remedy because, under the circumstances, the officers' failure to
knock-and-wait was not an egregious violation of the statute, and
the interests that support the knock-and-wait requirement were
not infringed upon.
The seminal Utah case addressing violations of Utah's
knock-and-announce statute is State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah
1988).

In Buck, no one was present when the officers initially

entered the defendant's residence.

Nevertheless, the officers

clearly violated the knock-and-announce requirement by making a
forced entry into the defendant's residence on a no-knock basis
even though the search warrant did not authorize a no-knock
service. JId. at 701-02.

In determining what remedy was

appropriate, the Court analyzed the violation in terms of how it
affected the interests that the statute was intended to protect.
As the Buck Court explained:
The basic interests that support the
knock-and-announce requirement are (1) the
protection of an individual's private
activities within his home, (2) the
prevention of violence and physical injury to
both police and occupants which [sic] may
result from an unannounced police entry, and
(3) the prevention of property damage
resulting from forced entry.
Buck, 756 P.2d at 701 (citations omitted).
The Buck Court concluded that "[i]£ no one is present
to admit the officers executing the warrant, two of the three
interests are not implicated.

Execution of a warrant does not

invade the privacy of a person who is not home except to the
extent it would have been invaded anyway and no one is endangered

9

by an unannounced police intrusion [when no one is present]*"
Id.

Finally, because a forced entry would have taken place

anyway, the third interest was not compromised.
Although this case is different from Buck because
defendant and his wife were on the premises at the time the
warrant was served, Buck is still controlling insofar as it
identifies the interests that are advanced by the knock-andannounce requirement and the analysis that is to be employed when
a violation has occurred.

As demonstrated below, none of the

interests identified in Buck were appreciably compromised by the
police conduct in this case.
The first interest advanced by the knock-and-announce
requirement is the protection of an individual's private
activities within his home.

Here, it is undisputed that

defendant was outside the residence as the police approached.
Upon seeing the police and hearing them identify themselves as
police officers, defendant fled.

Judd was already at the front

of the house as he saw his fellow officers run past him in
pursuit of defendant.

He then "grabbed the door" and again

called "[p]olice" (R. 209). According to Judd, "[t]he interior
door was wide open [and he] could see right into the living room"
(R. 208). Defendant's wife and daughter were sitting on a couch
with the marijuana approximately five feet away from defendant's
wife (R. 150-01).
yelled, M[p]olice.

Judd opened the storm door, stepped inside and
Don't move" (R. 209).

The activities within the house were clearly visible to
10

Judd through the open door. Moreover, defendant was not even in
the house, but had instead elected to flee from the police.

The

trial court recognized both of these factors in its ruling and
noted that they "obviated in part" the need to knock-and-wait (R.
237).

Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see how the

protection of defendant's private activities within the residence
was diminished to an appreciably greater degree than it would
have been had Judd watched the activities that occurred inside
the house from the other side of the storm door. ££. State v.
Suits, 243 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Wis. 1976) (Because the front door
was open and the officers could see inside the house, "[i]t is
difficult to maintain that the privacy of the living room
occupants was any more violated by the officers' presence inside
of the threshold rather than a few feet back.").
The second purpose for the knock-and-announce
requirement, "the prevention of violence and injury to both
police and occupants which [sic] may result from an unannounced
police entry," was also satisfied by the police conduct in this
case for two reasons.

Buck, 756 P.2d at 701. First, this was

not an "unannounced" entry, and second, Judd's conduct did not
increase the likelihood of violence or injury to the parties
involved.
As the trial court found, the police announced their
authority before entering defendant's residence (R. 236).
Indeed, even defendant acknowledged that he heard one of the
officers yell "[p]olice.

Stop." and that the officers "jumped on

11

[him], and pulled [him] to the ground" when he was approximately
ten feet away from the house (R. 200-02).

Watson testified that

one of the officers yelled, "Search warrant; police" (R. 173).
Similarly, Judd testified that he shouted "police" when he was at
the corner of the yard and again as he was running toward
defendant (R. 208). When he was at the front door and could see
that defendant was still running, Judd yelled, "Stop, Ringo;
police" (R. 208). At that point, Judd saw other officers run
past him in pursuit of defendant (R. 209).
Given that defendant was attempting to elude the
police, Judd's decision to open the door and step inside the
doorway served to prevent defendant's wife from similarly
attempting to flee.

Had defendant's wife been allowed an

opportunity to flee and elected to do so, the risk that either
she or the officers would have been injured because of the
ensuing struggle would have increased.

Consequently, under the

circumstances, Judd's conduct may actually have served to prevent
precisely the type of violence or injury the knock-and-wait
requirement is normally intended to curtail.

Certainly, there is

nothing that suggests that Judd's conduct heightened the risk of
such injury.

The second interest that supports the knock-and-

announce requirement was therefore preserved in this case.
The third interest that is advanced by the knock-andannounce requirement is "the prevention of property damage
resulting from forced entry . ; . which usually is the least
significant interest of the three. . . . "

12

Buck, 756 P.2d at 701.

In this case, Judd merely opened the storm, which was unlocked,
and stepped through the open doorway.
Judd's entry.

No property was damaged by

The outcome was no different than it would have

been had Judd knocked and waited for defendant's wife to respond.
If defendant's wife would have admitted Judd, Judd would have
entered the home.
Judd —

If she had either ignored or refused to admit

or even attempted to flee like defendant, then Judd would

have been justified in opening the door himself.

Consequently,

the third justification for the knock-and-wait requirement is not
implicated in this case.
Although the trial court did not expressly rely on the
criteria established in Buck when announcing its findings, it is
clear from the record that the trial court considered the Buck
analysis in reaching its determinations (R. 215-18).

The trial

court recognized that the officers did not knock-and-wait as
required by the statute, but in perhaps somewhat unartfully
phrased findings, the court explained why the officers' failure
to knock on the storm door and await a response was not an
egregious violation of the statute (R. 59, 236-37).
The officers' no-knock manner of entry was not
authorized by the warrant or by exigent circumstances.

However,

the officers' conduct does not constitute an egregious violation
of § 77-23-10. As in Buck, the violation "did not contribute
appreciably to the invasion of privacy already authorized by the
warrant."

Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. Consequently, the trial

court's approach to defendant's motion to suppress and its denial
13

of that motion are both consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Buck,

Moreover, although it had not been decided at

the time of defendant's case, the Utah Supreme Court's recent
decision is State v. Rowe, 196 P.2d 14 (Utah September 28, 1992),
provides additional support for the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress.
In the course of discussing a violation of Utah's
nighttime search authorization provision, the Utah Supreme Court
reaffirmed the analysis it adopted in State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d
1366 (Utah 1987), for instances in which police fail to comply
with statutory requirements.

In Rowe, the court reiterated that

suppression of evidence is an appropriate
remedy for illegal police conduct only when
that conduct implicates a fundamental
violation of a defendant's rights:
"Only a 'fundamental' violation of [a
rule of criminal procedure] requires
automatic suppression, and a violation is
'fundamental' only where it, in effect,
renders the search unconstitutional under
traditional fourth amendment standards.
Where the alleged violation . . . is not
'fundamental' suppression is required only
where: (1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense
that the search might not have occurred or
would not have been so abrasive if the [r]ule
had been followed, or (2) there is evidence
of intentional and deliberate disregard of a
provision of the [r]ule. . . .
. . . It is only where the violation
also implicates fundamental, constitutional
concerns, is conducted in bad-faith or has
substantially prejudiced the defendant that
exclusion may be an appropriate remedy."
Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15 (quoting Fixel) (footnotes
omitted).

After determining that Rowe was not substantially

prejudiced by the police violation, and that there was no
14

evidence that the officers had executed the search in bad-faith,
the court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that suppression
was not warranted.

.Id. at 16.

Similarly, there is nothing in the record that
indicates that defendant was "substantially prejudiced" by Judd's
failure to knock-and-wait as is required under § 77-23-10. Nor
is there any evidence that the officers conducted the search in
"bad-faith."

Indeed, as was true in Buck, defendant does not

"claim that either the fact of entry or the search and seizure
was otherwise unlawful.
entry was unlawful."

The claim is only that the manner of

Buck, 756 P.2d at 703.

This Court should

therefore uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
to suppress because it is consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's decisions in Buck and Rowe.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
and affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^tS^

day of November,

1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
TODD A. UTZJ^GER*
Assistant Attorney General
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J uniform, saw them in the vicinity of police vehicles, and
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J that, according to the testimony of at least some of the

8

police officers, he fled from the police.

9

It's my finding that actual notice is the legal

10

requirement, and that occurred in this instance.
Further, itfs my finding that based upon the

11
12

Further, itfs my finding that the circumstances

I testimony of Officers Watson and Judd, the door in question

13

was open, not closed, obviating in part the knock

14

requirement, especially in view of the fact that the

15

testimony was clear that the defendant had already seen

16

these individuals as he was exiting, or as he had already

17

J exited the vehicle.

18

I

19

J testified on behalf of the defendant, to the fact that

20

J there was considerable damage done to the door frame and

21

J pounding against the door frame, was not a credible witness

22

J in any respect.

23

I else, and in fact was contradicted by the testimony of

24

I everyone else.

25

Itfs further my finding that Mrs. Ribe, who

Her testimony was not supported by anyone

No one heard these sounds or saw the damage

that she described.

0237
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

LUILULLLI

lenying t h e motio

suppress.

spears at t h i s poir 1

Thai beinq the etisp,

:me t h a t we need fi > ot

th EMI! II" I Jl I'lispositli

MR. BREEZE

I

M l I'll f i i i M l

II

ctuall;

this

en set ill for an

entrapment hearing, Your Honor.
Till 1 ! I r 1JPT,
\l

All I ni iiiiiJvll „, in ,

in cj

i i l , u I I'm,' n .-.xl

When would you like to ha .,/e that set?
MR. B R E E Z E :

I > Il II

II i IM, Il I u II; n o f f f n ni I he 1 s t

.rough Lhe I6tJi ot October , sir; am j,,1" III: 11111= jthe i* than thi.it:
e

iine,
11 IK <

*~r entrapment, which apparent.

contemplated

ten days.

This matter has been

I think certainly Mr. Ribe *- entitled *-~1
matters that you deeu lii IM< important heard,
pceily
^trapmer
^*« » * 3 .

I ni ni I: li i:1 • "!»,•" mi: ill:

is not dispositive, I'd like 1: :»
— * you have that filed within tei i days,

MR. BREEZE
THE COURT:

Lemcke,

I i li dii 1 ft i i d

~ertainly, Your Honor.
All right, ten days from toda

_

_

respon^

•

.uxd

i
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ADDENDUM B

Ti'iird JuriiCi?."1 D:3tr-ct

ROBERT BREEZE #4278
Attorney for Defendant
211 East Broadway #215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 322-2138

.1

f>, ,

&IXZL

B^y-X-t :

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 1 OR SALT LAKE COUNTY,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

STATE
F
vs .

~M900559

ARTHUR RIBE,
L
I

nunuiowic

:

••

Septembe
After

ii'inif

i/voli6

(in

LeWiS

t i J ir

Mm i difi I
•

,

ripts

anc

I

fact announce their presence, that the testimony of the ueienaanx
wif

[UP-

t
_

- as ,i.nhsrent°l y nnhel i pvahlfe and that the police did not ncod~r^ u *~*
jlAujurs^J^ — **~* JZA*~ ^ ^ 2 ^ H ^ r ^ * v ^ / ^
'
^Z^Z^
t -purpose or wait foi a i^abunable time
^L#^X *A*»**'

,__

_ --

i iiifin * ".-in

for t h e o c c u p a n t s * v o l u n t a r i l y admi t t h e p o l i c e fret—the p u i p u - s ? "
.j&k—tr*-etrcrtThg " + F^ s e a r c h w a i r a u l b e e a u s e y *hii»e t h e s t o i nm c:lc c • i was
c. 1 n R f>

;;; nm i

py1 a 5

inn in i g i \ .

T I j g i UP f ry i g

| jig I|r + Sr i j

I ry 5 "! I p D 1 6 S S

UUUUiJtf

i»^*vU*

was denied.
SO ORDERED.
DATED this

7^>tday of September, 1991.
BY THE/QOURT:

/?^

/
Leslie Lewis, Distri

Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING,
I caused a copy of the foregoing to be mailed to:
Howard Lemcke
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

and

Arthur Ribe
^5175 South 4340 West~^*W£/
Kearns, Utah 84118
on this iS^Lls? dapf\f

Fnr\

September, 1991.

APPROVED AS TO^FORM AND CONTENT!

Howa
LemjCKe
Deputy Comity A t t o r n e y

?

000060

